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1 Introduction
Tests of Bayes Rule have been mainly conducted in controlled laboratory experiments,
where objective probabilities are set by the experimenter, and subjective probabilities are
identified with high precision (e.g., Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, 1982; Grether, 1980).1
The results from these experiments suggest that errors in expectations are systematic,
and have contributed significantly towards the advancement of behavioural economics.2
However, because “real-life” economic decisions differ substantially from decisions in the
laboratory (Harrison and List, 2004), it is important to complement the experimental
literature with tests of Bayesian reasoning based on naturally occurring data from the
field. In this study we take a step in this direction, utilizing a feature of professional tennis
matches to test an aspect of Bayes Rule, analysing subjective probabilities inferred from
the odds offered by professional bookmakers on the outcomes of these matches.
Bayes Rule requires that agents attach a larger weight on signals that are more
informative with lower “process variance”. In a seminal paper on Bayesian Updating,
Edwards (1968) shows that experimental subjects “underreact” to information with low
process variance that implies a large update from the prior probability. We examine
whether economic agents behave in a similar manner in the field, by analysing subjective
probabilities inferred from odds offered by bookmakers on the outcomes of tennis matches,
exploiting exogenous variation in process variance that is related to the format with which
tennis matches are played.
Men’s singles tennis matches are played in two formats: A best- out-of-three set
format (BO3), where a player must win two out of possible three sets to win a match,
1For a review of the experimental literature on Bayesian Updating see Appendix B in Benjamin,
Rabin and Raymond (2016).
2The experimental evidence of non-Bayesian reasoning have received applications in decision theory
(e.g., Rabin and Vayanos, 2010; Gennaioli and Shleifer, 2010; Benjamin, Rabin and Raymond, 2016)
and financial economics (e.g., Shefrin and Statman, 1994; Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998; Barberis,
Greenwood, Jin and Shleifer, 2015).
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and a best-out-of-five set format (BO5), where a player must win three out of possible
five sets to win a match.3 In our sample, the BO5 matches are called “Grand Slams”
(GS), and the BO3 matches are called “ATP World Tour Masters 1000” (MS). In each
of these match types bookmakers observe signals that capture a player’s skill on the day,
calculate the subjective probability that this player wins the match, and set their odds
accordingly.
One such signal that is related to a player’s skill on the day is their official ranking,
which is based on their cumulative performance during the previous 52 weeks.4 Higher
ranked players are generally more skilful, and therefore more likely to win a match. If
ranking is a perfect indicator of skill on the day, then process variance is zero and the
probability that the higher-ranked player wins is one. However, because skill on the day
is affected by random components, ranking is an imperfect indicator of skill on the day,
so the probability that the higher-ranked player wins is less than one. How much less
depends on the variance of the process, i.e., how likely it is that the lower-ranked player
produces a surprise and wins the match. If a surprise is less likely, then the probability
that the higher-ranked player wins the match should be adjusted upward.
A surprise is less likely in the GS format because the lower-ranked player must win
more sets to win the match.5 To illustrate this idea with an analogue from coin spins,
assume that we have a biased coin with probability of heads in a single toss equal to
3Each set is comprised by individual games, and to win one set a player must win at least 6 games.
To win one game a player must win at least four points. For more information on the rules of tennis see
http://www.atpworldtour.com.
4Rankings are based on the ammount of points accumulated by a player during their past 52
weeks performance from a total of 18 tournaments (or 19, if a player participates in the ATP
World Tour Finals). A player’s total ranking points are calculated from the four Grand Slams,
eight compulsory Masters 1000 tournaments (out of nine), and his best six results (in terms of
points) from all other ATP and Futures tournaments that he participates. For more information see
http://www.atpworldtour.com/en/corporate/rulebook. For each match that involves two players, we
refer to the player with the highest ranking (i.e., a smaller ranking number), as the higher-ranked player.
5Klaassen and Magnus (2014) also make this point. They develop a model to estimate the probability
of a player winning a specific point, and show that the higher skill player is more likely to win a longer,
as opposed to a shorter, match.
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60%. The probability that we receive two heads out of a possible three spins is 64.8%,
and the probability that we receive three heads out of a possible five spins is 68.3%.
The increase in the probability in each case reflects a reduction in process variance in the
sense that it becomes more difficult for the low probability event (i.e., tails in this example
or the lower-ranked player winning in our framework) to “win” when more successes are
required. Indeed, in line with this logic, we find that higher-ranked players are 7.2% more
likely to win a GS match, as opposed to an MS match, which implies that ranking is a
lower process variance signal for GS. Therefore, Bayes Rule dictates that bookmaker’s
probabilities for higher-ranked players winning must be adjusted upward for GS. Our
objective is to test whether such an adjustment takes place.
For our main analysis we use subjective probabilities inferred from fixed decimal
odds offered by several major betting houses on professional men’s tennis matches for
the period 2005 to 2014. For each match we infer the subjective probability that the
higher-ranked player wins the match from bookmaker odds, pi, estimate the “objective”
probability as the fitted value from a logit model, pˆ, and define bias as pi − pˆ. We
test our hypothesis based on the difference in the average bias between MS and GS.6
If bookmakers upwardly adjust pi for GS to reflect the increase in pˆ due to the longer
match format (BO5), then this difference should be 0. Alternatively, under the alternative
hypothesis of underreaction due to process variance neglect, bias should be lower for GS
matches.
Our results show that bias is equal to 0.4% for MS matches and -3.8% for MS
matches, for a statistically significant difference of -3.4%. Given that pˆ is 7% higher
for GS matches, this result shows that bookmakers are adjusting their probabilities in
the correct direction, but stop roughly half-way from the level implied by full Bayesian
6By testing the hypothesis based on the difference in bias across MS and GS our conclusions are not
affected by any systematic errors in the estimation of pi or pˆ that are constant across the two match
formats. We discuss our methods in detail in Section 2.
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Reasoning (7.2% - 3.4% = 3.8%). This is the central finding of our paper, which suggests
that deviations from Bayesian Reasoning matter for real-life economic decisions.
Could our results reflect strategic behavior by rational bookmakers to exploit “ir-
rational” punters and not process variance neglect? In this setting bookmakers are in a
position to act strategically because they set the odds on both players, thus could “salt”
them in opportune directions. For example, Levitt (2004) finds that, in spread-betting
markets, bookmakers sometimes offer biased prices to exploit certain tendencies among
punters.
To examine whether strategic behavior is driving our results we re-do our tests
using subjective probabilities inferred from odds which are set competitively in a person-
to-person real-life market called Betfair. In this setting strategic incentives do not exist,
since the odds for the two players are not set by the same agent but rather are determined
competitively by different punters in two different markets.7 Analysing tennis matches
for the period 2009-2014, we find that bias is lower for GS by -2.7%, and this differ-
ence is highly statistically significant and comparable in magnitude to that found with
bookmaker data.
To further examine the role of strategic incentives we examine whether it is optimal
for bookmakers to offer excessively high odds for the higher-ranked player for GS matches
(which amounts to a negative bias). To put this in context, these excessively high odds
on the higher-ranked player imply that bookmakers are collecting 4.5% less on average of
every dollar bet on the higher-ranked player for GS matches. Therefore, for the negative
bias to be optimal, bookmakers should be earning proportionately more from bets on the
lower-ranked player, so that their total profitability per GS game increases. Contrary to
this notion, we find that bookmaker’s total profits per match (as a proportion of the total
volume staked) are lower for GS matches by an average of -2.5%, which suggests that
7In these markets prices converge to satisfy no arbitrage conditions, i.e., the sum of the implied
probabilities for each player winning are close to 1.
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underreaction is costly.
Overall, the analysis from the betting exchange data and bookmaker’s profits sug-
gests that our results are unlikely to reflect the strategic behavior of rational bookmakers.
A belief that is held by some economists is that individual biases do not matter
for the broader economy since they are wiped out when aggregated in a market setting
(e.g., Fama, 1998). Even though the results with the betting exchange data do not
support this notion,8 we conduct a sharper test for the “wisdom of crowds” hypothesis,
by examining whether high-volume matches, which aggregate information from a larger
number of punters, price the change in process variance in GS more accurately. We find
that they do, with the difference in bias between MS and GS being closer to 0. This result
provides some support to the idea that “deeper” markets are more efficient. However, we
find that high-volume markets do not completely eliminate the bias of underreaction due
to process variance neglect.
Our analysis implicitly assumes that MS and GS matches are the same in every
respect, except from the length of the match. However, GS matches offer more ranking
points and higher prize money to players, and attract more attention from punters. Could
our findings reflect these differences? For example, it is possible that bookmakers are
not be pricing correctly any “extra-motivation” of players to win the more lucrative GS
matches.
To examine whether such differences are driving our results we conduct a placebo
test using data for professional women’s tennis matches. For women, GS matches also
offer more ranking points and prize money, and attract more betting volume but they
are played in a BO3 format, exactly like the MS tournaments. Hence, women’s matches
preserve key differences across the two match formats except for the change in process
variance. If the bias we document is driven by factors other than process variance neglect,
8Camerer (1987) also shows that experimental asset markets do not eliminate biases.
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bias should be lower for GS in the women’s data as well.
Logistic analysis confirms that the type of match (MS vs GS) does not affect the
probability that the higher-ranked player wins for women’s matches, consistent with no
difference in process variance across match formats. Therefore, bookmakers should not
adjust pi upward for GS. When we compare bias calculated from bookmaker odds for
MS and GS we find that the difference is insignificant. When we do the same for bias
calculated from betting exchange odds, we find that bias is higher in GS by 1.2%. Overall,
the results obtained from the women’s data are starkly different to those obtained from
the men data, which suggests that our baseline results more likely reflect underreaction
due to process variance neglect.
We conduct various robustness checks. First, we show that our results continue to
hold for different specifications for bias. Second, we consider alternative explanations for
our findings, such as different levels of “noise trading”, changes in bookmaker preferences,
or different levels of competition across MS and GS matches. We conclude that such
alternative explanations cannot offer a parsimonious interpretation for all our results,
across bookmaker and betting exchange markets, for both men’s and women’s matches.
However, with the field data we cannot rule out the possibility that our findings
are influenced by an economic quantity that varies between MS and GS. Motivated by
this limitation, our final robustness test is a laboratory experiment, which allows testing
process variance neglect in a setting that removes the effect of any confounding economic
factors. Even though the experiment is subject to the general methodological limitations
of experimental methods, it is nevertheless a useful plausibility test, since our field analysis
suggests a sharp hypothesis that can be tested easily in the laboratory.
We invited university students who were involved in tennis activities to participate
in the experiment. These students were asked to consider upcoming matches from two
tournaments, one MS and the other GS, and assign probabilities to each player winning.
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Our objective was to test whether subjects adjust their probabilities for the effect of the
length of the match on the probability that the higher-ranked players wins.
The results from the experiment reveal a significant bias of underreaction due to
process variance neglect. Specifically, we find that for MS matches bias is equal to 0.00%,
whereas for GS matches bias is equal to -3.30%, with the difference being statistically
significant. This difference is driven by the fact that the subjective probabilities expressed
by students show no adjustment to reflect the reduction in process variance in GS. Overall,
the experimental analysis provides further support to the claim that our baseline findings
from the field reflect process variance neglect.
Biases due to process variance neglect are likely to influence outcomes in equity
markets, where investors set prices by continually responding to information that varies
in process variance. If investors respond to signals according to their process variance,
stock prices would respond immediately to these signals, thus future stock returns would
be unpredictable. However, if investors are insensitive to process variance, low process
variance signals would not move prices sufficiently, which will lead to future stock returns
being predictable in the direction implied by the signal (i.e., rise after good news and fall
after bad news).
For our final test we test this hypothesis using financial data. The signal we use
is the median earnings forecast revision issued by professional sell-side analysts for a
specific company prior to the actual earnings announcement. To measure the process
variance of the signal we split the companies in two groups; high-coverage firms followed
by many analysts, and low-coverage firms followed by few analysts. The signal is of
lower process variance for high-coverage firms because it incorporates information from
more analysts about future earnings. In line with this logic, we show that signals as-
sociated with high-coverage firms are more predictive of earnings shocks, which means
that Bayesian investors should price them more strongly. We find that investors do this
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partly, which makes future returns predictable. The economic effect associated with this
predictability is not trivial, amounting to an annualized return differential between high
and low coverage firms of around 2%.
Tests of Bayes Rule have been mainly conducted in controlled laboratory experi-
ments (Grether, 1980, 1992; Camerer, 1987; Griffin and Tversky, 1992; Holt and Smith,
2009; Antoniou, Harrison, Lu and Read, 2017). However, because the extent to which
laboratory findings carry over into the field is unclear, it is important to analyse both
laboratory and field generated data to properly understand the process of belief forma-
tion. Along these lines, DeBondt and Thaler (1990) present evidence that the earnings
forecasts of professional security analysts are affected by representativeness, and Chen,
Moskowitz and Shue (2016) show that the decisions of asylum judges, loan officers and
baseball umpires are affected by the gambler’s fallacy.
We contribute to this literature conducting a field test of Bayesian reasoning with
three attractive features: Firstly, subjective probabilities are inferred from the decisions of
expert agents who are pricing securities in their natural habitat with significant monetary
consequences. Secondly, uncertainty is fully resolved when the match is finished, which
allows us to test for a bias in subjective probabilities with relatively weak assumptions.
Thirdly, and most importantly, in the tennis data the variation in process variance that
allows us to test for Bayesian reasoning is completely exogenous, in the sense that it
is governed solely by the rules of the game. Our findings suggest that decision makers
do not combine cues optimally when forming expectations and support the claim that
violations of Bayes Rule affect real-life economic decisions.
Our analysis also contributes to the behavioral finance literature, which has at-
tributed various asset pricing anomalies to investor underreaction (i.e., Ball and Brown,
1968; Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993; Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Ikenberry, Lakonishok
and Vermaelen, 1995; Michaely, Thaler and Womack, 1995; Zhang, 2006; Jiang and Zhu,
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2016). According to this explanation, investors fail to recognize that certain information
signals are good indicators of fundamentals, and therefore do not price them as strongly
as they should. With the passage of time, as the fundamentals are slowly revealed and
expectations are adjusted, prices drift toward their equilibrium values. A caveat of these
interpretations (including our own interpretation of the results from the aforementioned
asset pricing test) is that they rely on assumptions related to expected equity returns,
or what Fama (1998) calls the joint hypothesis problem. An interesting exception in this
literature is Moskowitz (2015), who tests for the existence of asset pricing anomalies in
sports betting markets where risks are completely idiosyncratic, and therefore Fama’s
(1998) critique does not apply. In a similar spirit, we contribute by testing underreaction
in a setting that requires relatively weak assumptions. Our results support the claim that
underreaction can cause stock prices to adjust slowly to certain information.
Finally, our work makes a more general contribution to the literature that discusses
whether behavior in the laboratory captures behavior in the field (e.g., Levitt and List,
2007; Al-Ubaydli, List and Suskind, 2017). Our results show that the biases in the
experimental data are qualitatively similar (i.e., of the same sign) to those in the field data,
which suggests that behavior is broadly similar in the two domains. However, the results
also show that the biases in the laboratory are larger, since the subjective probabilities of
students show no adjustment to the reduction in process variance for GS matches. This
is an important difference in behavior, which relects the fact that conditions in the two
domains diverge in significant ways.9 These findings support the notion that the two
approaches are complementary, as concluded by Harrison and List (2004). Laboratory
9As discussed in Harrison and List (2004) the field differs from the laboratory in at least two funda-
mental ways: Firstly, the field can help create heuristics that affect decision making, which are probably
not present in the “sterile” environment of the laboratory where subjects encounter artificial tasks for
the first time (e.g., List, 2004 and Haigh and List, 2005). And secondly, incentives in the laboratory
tend to be weak, therefore behavior inferred from this domain may not be directly applicable to real-life
economic decisions where the stakes are significantly higher (e.g., Andersen, Ertac, Gneezy, Hoffman and
List, 2011). Other studies that point to differences between lab and field behavior include Levitt and
List (2007a,b) and Levitt, List and Reiley (2010).
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experiments, with their flexibility and control, are useful in capturing broad patterns
in behavior and generate hypotheses, but field tests are required to properly test the
robustness of an experimental phenomenon, and recover the magnitude of the underlying
parameters.
The next section describes our data, methods and hypothesis. The third section
presents and discusses the results, and the fourth section concludes the paper.
2 Data and Methods
2.1 Data
For our baseline analysis we obtain data from www.tennis-data.co.uk.10 For every match
this database contains data the name of the tournament, the date of the match, the names
of the two competing players, their official ATP rankings, the winner of the match, as
well as fixed decimal odds from various international betting houses on both players.11 In
our analysis, we average the odds offered by the various bookmakers on the two players
and then use these average odds to infer subjective probabilities.
We include in our sample Grand Slam (GS) matches, which are played in a BO5
format, and ATP World Tour Masters 1000 matches (MS), which are played in a BO3
format. GS tournaments are the most prestigious, with the winner receiving 2,000 ranking
points, and on average collecting 2.5 million dollars (in 2015). For comparison, the winner
of an MS tournament earns 1,000 ranking points and, on average, 0.8 million dollars (in
2015). There are other tournaments that are played in a BO3 format, which yield, for
example, 500 or 250 ranking points to the winner of the tournament, and offer less prize
money. Such tournaments are significantly less prestigious, involving on average lower-
10Data from this database has been used previously by academic work on tennis matches (e.g., Forrest
and McHale, 2007; Del Corral and Prieto-Rodriguez, 2010).
11This dataset contains odds from eight different bookmakers; Bet365, Centrebet, Expekt, Ladbrokes,
Interwetten, Pinnacles Sports, Stan & James, and Unibet.
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ranked players, and attracting less attention from punters. In our analysis, to ensure that
the BO3 matches are as similar as possible to the BO5 GS matches, we focus on the more
prestigious tournaments from the BO3 class.
We apply the following criteria to the initial dataset (n=10,790) to create our final
sample: (i) we drop matches that were not completed, matches with missing rankings
information, matches with no odds for either player, and matches that entail a negative
housetake or “Vig”,12 (n=10,266); (ii) we drop matches where the higher-ranked player
is indicated as an outsider by bookmakers even though he is ranked by at least 15 places
higher than his opponent at the beginning of the tournament (n=9,230). Such cases are
likely to reflect recent developments like injuries, which are not yet incorporated in the
rankings, thus making them outdated indicators of skill.13
Our final sample consists of 9,230 tennis matches from 2005-2014. Table 1 breaks
down the matches by year and tournament. Overall, we have data for 4 GS tournaments,
and for 12 MS tournaments. Some MS tournaments are discontinued and others are
introduced at various point in time.
[Insert Table 1 here]
2.2 Methods
Assume a tennis match between players X and Y . The bookmaker offers fixed decimals
odds for player X to win equal to dX , and for player Y equal to dY , where dX and dY are
greater than 1. To obtain subjective probabilities, we first invert the quoted odds for X,
OX = 1dX , and for Y , OY =
1
dY
. In a perfectly competitive and frictionless market with
12Vig stands for “vigorish”, and reflects the fact that odds, when inverted and added together, typically
sum to more than 1. This reflects a form of commission collected by the bookmaker. Matches with
negative vig are likely to be data errors.
13Since our analysis examines how rankings, as signals about skill on the day, are priced across MS
and GS, filter (ii) eliminates cases where rankings are outdated, thus less informative. However, our
conclusions remain the same if we do not impose this filter. This is discussed in more detail in Section
3.6 of the paper.
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a risk-neutral bookmaker, OX and OY correspond to true subjective beliefs. However,
typically OX+OY > 1, which reflects the vigorish or “vig”, a form of commission collected
by the bookie. To obtain subjective probabilities we normalize OX and OY to sum to 1,
using piX = OXOX+OY and piY =
OY
OX+OY . The vig is thus split proportionally between the
two players, depending on their relative odds.14 Throughout the analysis we refer to pii
as the subjective probability that the higher-ranked player wins match i.
To examine whether process variance changes across match format (MS vs. GS) we
use the logistic model, shown below:
Pr(Yi = 1|GSi, Rskilli) = F (α + β1GSi + β2Rskilli) (1)
The dependent variable, Yi is a binary indicator taking the value of 1 if the higher-ranked
player wins match i, and 0 otherwise. GSi is a dummy variable that equals 1 if match
i is Grand Slam, and 0 otherwise. RSkilli captures differences in player rankings for
match i and is calculated as log(lower-ranked player ranking) - log (higher-ranked player),
following the specification in Klaasen and Magnus (2001).15F is the logistic distribution.
As we discuss in more detail in the next section, GS matches entail more players in
the draw, and therefore entail higher average ranking differences between the two players.
The model in Equation (1) captures the effect of the change in process variance across
MS and GS, whilst controlling for these ranking differences. That is, the coefficient on
GS should be positive and significant, reflecting the increase in the probability that the
higher-ranked player wins a GS match due to the longer match format (BO5).
14This method of recovering beliefs from odds is typical in the literature (e.g., Croxson and Reade,
2014; Smith, Paton and Williams, 2009).
15As discussed in Klaasen and Magnus (2001) player skill in tennis resembles a pyramid (i.e., the
difference in skill between players ranked #1 and #10 is higher than the skill difference between players
ranked #80 and #90), therefore a logarithmic transformation is appropriate. Note also that the ranking
of the lower-ranked player is a larger number than the ranking of the higher-ranked player. Our results
are the same if we calculate RSkill on the basis of differences in the ranking points of the two competing
players.
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To estimate the bias in subjective probabilities we use biasi = pii− pˆi, where pˆi is the
fitted value from the logit model. In this setting pˆi acts as a benchmark, which for each
match takes into account the format (MS vs. GS) and RSkill, and on average reflects the
actual frequency that higher-ranked players win MS and GS matches in our sample. We
test our hypothesis based on the difference in average bias between MS and GS matches,
∆bias = biasGS − biasMS. With this formulation our conclusions are not affected by any
systematic errors in pii or pˆi that are symmetric across the two match formats.16
Under the null hypothesis of Bayesian reasoning, where subjective probabilities are
properly adjusted to changes in process variance between MS and GS, ∆bias = 0. The
alternative hypothesis of underestimation due to process variance neglect is ∆bias < 0. We
test these hypotheses by examining the sign and statistical significance (using two-sided
tests) of β1 in the ordinary least square regression shown below:
biasi = α + β1GSi + β2RSkilli + i (2)
2.3 Psychological Foundations
In a seminal laboratory-based experiment on Bayesian updating Edwards (1968) showed
that subjects underreact to information that implies a large update to the prior prob-
ability. Similar results are shown by Griffin and Tversky (1992), and more recently by
Antoniou, Harrison, Lau and Read (2017). Such behaviors could reflect what Benjamin
et al. (2016) call a non-belief in the law of large numbers (NBLLN).17 This phenomenon
was demonstrated in an early study by Kahneman and Tversky (1972), who compared
responses to questions like “What is the probability that I obtain between 4 and 6 heads
16However, it is possible that the errors are asymmetric and infuence our results, e.g., the logit model
may omit factors that vary across MS and GS matches. In Sections 3.6 and 3.7 we discuss in detail
potential sources of asymmetric errors, and when possible address them econometrically.
17Benjamin et al. (2016) show that a decision-maker who displays NBLLN will always underreact
to information from large samples. Moreover, they show that NBLLN influences key decisions such as
information acquisition, optimal stopping and the valuation of risky prospects.
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if I toss a fair coin 10 times?” and “What is the probability that I obtain between 4,000
and 6,000 heads if I toss a fair coin 10,000 times?” The law of large numbers implies
that the probability is much higher in the latter question. However, subjects expressed
similar probabilities in these questions, which suggests an insensitivity to the effect of
sample size on sampling errors.
We can draw a parallel between sample size in these experiments and match length
in our real-world analysis. In our setting a sampling error occurs when the player with
the highest skill on the day, which we proxy using rankings, loses the match. A sampling
error is less likely in the longer GS matches, thus Bayesian agents should assign higher
probabilities to higher-ranked players for these matches. However, if due to NBLLN
agents do not appropriately account for the effect of match length on sampling error,
they would underestimate the likelihood that the higher-ranked player wins a GS match.
2.4 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for our main sample, separately for GS (Panel A)
and MS (Panel B) matches. The average posted odds offered by bookmakers that the
higher-ranked player wins the match (HROdds) are much lower than those for the lower-
ranked player (LROdds) (1.35 vs. 6.05 for GS and 1.48 vs. 4.10 for MS), which shows
that player ranking is indeed a metric for skill on the day that is used by bookmakers.
The vig is roughly equal in the two match formats (0.05 in GS and 0.06 in MS) and
has low volatility, as noted by other authors (Forrest and McHale, 2007). For GS the
average ranking of high- and lower-ranked players (HRRank and LRRank) is 28 and 99
respectively, whereas for MS the corresponding rankings are 22 and 67. GS matches entail
higher ranking differences because GS tournaments allow more players in the draw.18 The
18GS matches involve 128 players, whereas MS matches involve 64 players on average (96 players: In-
dian Wells and Miami; 56 players: Monte Carlo, Madrid, Rome, Montreal, Toronto, Cincinatti, Shanghai;
48 players: Paris). In all tournaments the “seeded” players are allowed to compete automatically in the
tournament, for example the top 32 players in the world. The remaining positions are filled by lower
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higher ranking differences in GS imply that the probability of the higher-ranked player
winning a GS match is higher, therefore we test the hypothesis using the model in (2),
which includes RSkill as a control variable.
The next two rows show the average estimate of the objective probability obtained
as the fitted value from the model in Equation (1), (pˆ). As it can be seen, pˆ is higher for
GS than MS (0.78 vs 0.69), consistent with the view that higher-ranked players are more
likely to win a GS match (we present the full results from the logit model in the next
section). The penultimate row in the table shows the average subjective probability that
the higher-ranked player wins the match (pi), which is higher for GS compared to MS (0.74
vs. 0.68). This means that bookmakers are adjusting their subjective probabilities for
GS matches relative to MS matches in the direction predicted by Bayes Rule. However,
this adjustment seems insufficient, i.e., it does not completely reflect the increase pˆ for
GS. This result, shown in Figure 1, provides some early support to the process variance
neglect hypothesis, which we formally test in the next section.
[Insert Table 2 and Figure 1 here]
3 Analysis
3.1 Changes in Process Variance
We start our analysis by examining whether the higher-ranked player is more likely to
win a GS as opposed to an MS match using the model shown in Equation (1).
The marginal effects associated with each variable are shown in Table 3. We run
specifications with and without RSkill, and a specification that additionally includes
ranked players who earn their position by qualifying in a single elimination tournament prior to the main
event. The number of seeded players varies by tournament, and is higher in GS than in MS.
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fixed effects related to the surface that the match is played on (clay vs. hard),19 the
round of the match (1 to 7), and the year that it takes place.20
From Column (1) we observe that the marginal effect associated with GS is 9.5%
and highly statistically significant, indicating that higher-ranked players are more likely
to win a GS match. Once we control for RSkill in Column (2) the marginal effect
associated with GS reduces to 7.2%, but remains highly statistically significant. RSkill is
also positive and highly significant. From Column (3), we observe that the fixed effects
do not materially influence the results, with the coefficient of GS being equal to 6.9%.
Overall, this analysis shows that higher-ranked players are more likely to win GS
matches that are played in a BO5 format.
[Insert Table 3 here]
3.2 Biases in Subjective Probabilities
Table 4 shows our main results. In a univariate setting in Panel A, we find that biasGS
is equal to -3.8% and biasMS is equal to 0.4%, making ∆bias equal to -3.4%, and highly
statistically significant.
In Panel B, we test the hypothesis in a multivariate setting. We find that the
coefficient on GS is essentially the same, equal to -3.4% and highly statistically significant.
This result is not sensitive to surface, round and year fixed effects (Column 2).21 The
19The type of surface influences the speed that the match is played. The fastest surface is grass,
followed by hard courts, then carpets, then clay. One GS match is played on grass, one on clay, and two
on hard courts. In terms of MS tournaments, seven are played on hard courts and four are played on
clay courts. In our sample, the only tournament played on grass is the Wimbledon (GS), and the only
tournament played on carpet is Paris (MS) between 2005 and 2008. Because in terms of speed, grass and
carpet surfaces are more similar to hard than clay surfaces, we include them in the hard court category.
Surface dummies absorb any affects on the probability that the higher-ranked player wins related to
match tempo.
20Because prize money increase with the round of the match, round dummies absorb the effect that
such variations in prizes may have on the probability that the higher-ranked player wins. Year dummies
absorb any time-variation on the probability that the higher-ranked player wins.
21In this model, the fixed effects additionally capture any variations in the betting market that are
related to these dimensions.
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coefficient of RSkill is also negative and significant.
In untabulated analysis we replace bias with piHR as the dependent variable and
re-run the same model. In this specification the coefficient on GS is equal to 4.1% and
highly statistically significant. This shows that, to large extent, the increase in piHR
for GS (from 68.1% to 74.3%) reflects an adjustment according to match format (BO3
vs. BO5) in the direction implied by Bayesian reasoning. However, the adjustment is
insufficient, equal to roughly 59% of the change in pˆ that is attributed to match format
(4.1%/6.9%).
Overall, the results in Table 4 show that bookmakers are systematically underes-
timating the probability that the higher-ranked player wins a GS match, consistent with
the hypothesis of process variance neglect.
[Insert Table 4 here]
3.3 Betting Exchange Data
Could our results in the previous section reflect the strategic incentives of rational book-
makers to exploit punters? In this section we test our hypothesis using subjective probab-
ilities inferred from odds achieved on a person-to-person betting exchange called Betfair,22
where the capacity to manipulate odds does not exist. Moreover, this data set contains
information on the volume bet on each player, which we utilize to test the wisdom of
crowds hypothesis (WCH), (e.g., Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004).Our sample contains 4,893
observations for the period 2009-2014. Descriptive statistics for this sample are shown in
Section 2 of the Appendix.
22Betfair is the largest person-to-person betting exchange, with almost one million active users
(Croxson and Reade, 2014). The Betfair data set was purchased from Fracsoft, available at
http://www.fracsoft.com/. The dataset has incomplete coverage of the Australian Open (GS tour-
nament), with no observations for 2009 and 2010. Moreover, it does not include data for matches that
were completed in more than one day (for example due to rain delays). We use “back” odds on the
two players to calculate subjective probabilities (i.e., odds available to punters who want to bet that a
specific player wins).
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[Insert Table 5 here]
The results are shown in Table 5. In a univariate setting in Panel A, we find that
biasGS is equal to -1.8% and biasMS is equal to 0.5%, making ∆bias equal to -2.3%, and
highly statistically significant.
In Panel B, we test the hypothesis using multivariate analysis. Similar to the
analysis in Table 4 we observe that controlling for RSkill does not change our findings, as
the coefficient on the GS dummy is equal to -2.3% and statistically significant. Adding
surface, year and round fixed effects does not materially influence the result.
The point estimate of ∆bias is considerably smaller in the Betfair data than in the
bookmaker data (-2.3% vs -3.4%). However, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the
two are equal at the 5% level of confidence. Thus, the evidence in support of WCH from
this test is rather weak.
For our next test we conduct a sharper test of WCH by examining whether ∆bias
is closer to zero for high-volume matches, which incorporate information from a larger
number of traders. We use data on the volume that backs the higher-ranked player
(V olHR) to test this hypothesis. Specifically, for each match type (MS vs. GS) and round
of match (1 to 7), we rank according to V olHR, noting the median of the distribution. If,
for a specific match, V olHR is higher than the corresponding median then V olD equals 1,
otherwise it is 0.23 We re-estimate the model in Equation (2), by including V olD and the
interaction between V olD ×GS as additional regressors. The coefficient on V olD ×GS
tests whether the bias related to process variance neglect is different for high-volume
matches.
The results are shown in Column (3) of Table 5. We find that the coefficient on GS
(indicating ∆bias for low-volume matches) is equal to -3.0% and highly significant. The
23We note the median after we sort on the basis of match type and round of match because GS matches
attract higher volume, as do later rounds in a tournament. In this way, the dummy V olD is not capturing
mechanically such cases.
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coefficient on the interaction V olD×GS is positive and significant at 1.6%, indicating that
∆bias is closer to zero for high-volume matches (-3.0% +1.6% = -1.4%), which suggests
that “deeper” markets are more efficient, supporting WCH. However, the ∆bias of -1.4%
for high-volume matches is statistically significant,24 which suggests that these markets
do not completely eliminate the bias.
Overall, this analysis shows that a bias due to process variance neglect also exists
in the betting exchange data, where strategic incentives do not exist. Moreover, the bias
is smaller in matches that attract higher betting volume.
[Insert Table 5 here]
3.4 Profits
In this section, we examine the economic implications of the biases documented in Section
3.2. We derive various indicators of bookmaker’s profitability, using both bookmaker
(Panel A) and betting exchange odds (Panel B). The analysis in Panel B corresponds to
the profits collected by a hypothetical bookmaker, who offers odds on both players that
equal those achieved on the betting exchange.
The first profitability indicator we analyse is how much of each unit bet on the
higher-ranked player is collected by the bookmaker, rHR, using the expression below.
DHR is an indicator variable, equal to 1 if the higher-ranked player has won the match,
and 0 otherwise.
rHR =
1 if DHR = 0−(OHR − 1) if DHR = 1 (3)
24We obtain this result in untabulated analysis, where we re-run the model by specifying the volume
dummy based on low-volume matches.
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We can define an analogous metric for the lower-ranked player, rLR. We calculate
rHR and rLR for each match, and then compare the averages across MS and GS matches.
The results are shown in Table 6. From Panel A we see that rHR for MS is equal
to 5% and highly significant, whereas for GS it is 0.5% and insignificant. The difference
of -4.5% is highly significant. From the second column, rLR is 9.4% for MS and 29.8%
in GS, for a significant difference of 20.4%. Similar relationships are found in Panel B,
although the profitability is generally lower, and the differences between MS and GS
less significant.25 Overall, these figures are in line with the results in Tables 4 and 5.
Bookmakers are offering excessively high odds for the higher-ranked player in GS (bias <
0), and therefore on average earn less per unit staked for the corresponding bets. And, by
symmetry, bookmakers are on average offering excessively low odds for the lower-ranked
player in GS, thus earn more per-unit staked for those bets.
These figures are indicative, as the overall profitability of bookmakers depends on
how the betting volume is split across the two players. Specifically, as we show in Section
1 of the Appendix, it is optimal to “salt” the odds to imply a negative bias in GS (as
shown in Tables 4 and 5) only if the probability that the higher-ranked player wins is
higher than the proportion of volume that backs the higher-ranked player. This condition,
however, does not seem to hold in the data, since higher-ranked players win 78% of GS
matches, whereas they are on average backed by 86% of the volume. This suggests that
bookmakers are actually earning less in GS by offering odds that imply a negative bias.
To estimate this more concretely we estimate bookmaker’s actual profits, as a pro-
portion of the total volume staked for match i, Πi, using the volume information from
the betting exchange as below:26
Πi = 1−RV olHR × dHR ×DHR −RV olLR × dLR ×DLR (4)
RV olHR is the proportion of the total volume that backs the high ranked player, dHR
25The profits to the hypothetical bookmaker who offers betting exchange odds are lower because these
odds do not contain a vig (see Table 1 in Section 2 of the Appendix).
26This test assumes that volume for bookmakers behaves similarly to volume on the betting exchange.
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are the fixed decimal odds offered on the higher-ranked player and DHR is an indicator
that equals to one if the higher-ranked player won the match. RV olLR, dLR and DLR
are analogously defined for the lower-ranked player. From the third column of Panel A
we observe that Πi is equal to 2.5% for GS matches, and 5.00% for MS matches, for a
significant difference of -2.5%. The corresponding figure in Panel B is -1.9%.27 Thus,
bookmakers are earning a smaller proportion of the volume staked in GS relative to MS
matches.
As a final test we calculate the hypothetical profit HΠi collected by bookmakers in
a counterfactual world where they increased their subjective probabilities for the higher-
ranked player for each GS match by an amount equal to the average bias shown in
Tables 4 and 5 (-3.41% and -2.74%, respectively). For each GS match we calculate the
hypothetical odds that correspond to these probabilities, which we use to calculate HΠi
according to Equation 3.28 As shown in Column 5 of Table 6 the average value of HΠi
for GS matches is equal to 5.5%, significantly different from the average Πi of 2.5% .
Similar findings are found when using betting exchange odds, as shown in Panel B. This
exercise suggests that bookmaker’s profit as a proportion of volume would be higher in
the absence of a negative bias for GS.
Overall the analysis in this section is consistent with the notion that the biases due
to process variance neglect are costly to bookmakers.
[Insert Table 6 here]
3.5 A Placebo Test
Our tests implicitly assume that the only difference across MS and GS matches is match
format, i.e., BO3 vs. BO5. However, as mentioned, GS tournaments are more prestigious
than MS tournaments, offering more prize money and ranking points, and attracting
higher betting volumes. To examine whether our findings are affected by these differences
27Our results hold in a multivariate setting, when we regress Πi on a GS dummy and RSkill, including
round, time and surface fixed effects.
28This procedure is explained in detail in Section 1 of the Appendix.
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we conduct a placebo test using data for women’s tennis matches. This data provide an
ideal setting for such a test as they preserve the key differences across MS and GS that
are observed in the men’s sample (i.e., GS are more prestigious, offer more prize money
and ranking points, and attract more betting volume), but for women there is no change
in process variance because both MS and GS are played in a BO3 format. Therefore, if
our results are not driven by changes in process variance, ∆bias should continue to be
negative and significant in the women data.
We construct the women’s sample using an approach similar to that used in our
baseline analysis with the men’s data. GS tournaments are the same for women as for
the men, and for MS tournaments we again focus on the more prestigious tournaments.29
After applying the same filters to the initial sample as those for the men we end up with
2,527 MS matches and 3,624 GS matches from 2007-2014 for the bookmaker sample,
and 1,425 MS matches and 2,259 GS matches from 2009-2014 for the betting exchange
sample.
Tables 2 and 3 in Section 2 of the Appendix present descriptive statistics for the
women samples for MS and GS, and show that the vig and ranking differentials are very
similar as those found in the men data. From Table 3 we observe that TotVol is lower for
women than for men, whereas RVol is the same (85% in GS and 82% in MS). Overall,
the women samples are broadly similar to the men samples.
In Table 7 we present results from the logistic regressions shown in Equation (1)
using the women data (Panel A bookmaker, Panel B betting exchange). As shown in
Column (2), the coefficient on the GS dummy is insignificant once we control for RSkill,
consistent with no change in process variance in GS matches. Thus, bookmakers should
not upwardly adjust their subjective probabilities of the higher-ranked player winning a
GS match.
29Pre-2009, the top tier masters tournaments were called Tier-I and post-2009 they are called Premier
Mandatory. For the bookmaker sample we have 12 MS tournaments prior to 2009 (Berlin, Charleston,
Doha, Indian Wells, Miami, Montreal, Moscow, Rome, San Diego, Tokyo, Toronto, and Zurich) and
the 4 Premier Mandatory tournaments after 2009 (Beijing, Indian Wells, Madrid, Miami). The betting
exchange sample starts in 2009 so we have data on the 4 Premier Mandatory tournaments. The GS
matches for women are the same as for the men (Australian Open, French Open, Wimbledon, and US
Open).
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[Insert Table 7 here]
The results from the model in Equation (2) with women data are shown in Table
8. From Column (2) in Panel A (bookmaker), we observe that the coefficient on GS is
negative but statistically insignificant. The corresponding results in Panel B (betting
exchange) show that the coefficient on GS is positive and significant, equal to 1.2%,
reflecting the fact that punters are increasing their subjective probabilities for the higher-
ranked player winning a GS match, even though this increase is unwarranted.
Overall, the placebo test with the women’s data produces results that are in stark
contrast from those obtained with the men’s data. This suggests that our baseline results
in Tables 4 and 5 more likely reflect biases due to process variance neglect.
[Insert Table 8 here]
3.6 Robustness Checks
In this section, we conduct various tests of robustness, presenting the results in Table 9.
In Panel A, we define bias using subjective probabilities inferred from bookmaker odds
and in Panel B using betting exchange odds.
In our baseline analysis bias depends on the specification of the logit model used to
calculate pˆ. In Column (1) we test the hypothesis using a non-parametric specification
for the objective probability. We first sort our sample according to match format (MS
and GS) and then sort again within each format into deciles based on RSkill. In each
decile we calculate the proportion of matches won by the high-rank player, pHR, which
we use as the estimate of the objective probability for all the matches that belong in this
specific decile. We define bias for each match as pi − pHR, and estimate Equation (2).
The results are robust in this specification, as the coefficient of GS is equal to -3.5% in
Panel A and -2.6% in Panel B, both statistically significant.
In Column (2) we avoid altogether estimating an objective probability, and define
bias as pi−DHR, where DHR is a dummy that equals 1 if the higher-ranked player won the
match, and 0 otherwise. The coefficient on GS continues to be negative and significant.
24
Our procedure of estimating pˆ uses full sample information, which introduces some
look-ahead bias. To make sure that such a bias does not influence our findings in Column
(3), we estimate the logit model using only backward looking information. For example,
for matches played in 2006 (2007) we calculate pˆ estimated from a logit model that only
uses data from 2005 (2005 and 2006), etc. The coefficient of GS is equal to -4.3% in Panel
A and -3.2% in Panel B, both statistically significant.
Because GS matches offer more prize money it is possible that higher-ranked players
“time” their form to peak at GS matches. Such timing effects could influence our findings.
To address this issue in Column (4) we add an additional regressor in our models (includ-
ing the logit model), RStreak, calculated as the difference in the proportion of games
won by the high- and lower-ranked player in the two previous tournaments. The results
show that the coefficient on GS remains negative and significant in this specification,
equalling -2.7% in Panel A and -2.6% in Panel B.30
The information signal we use is the ranking of the players at the start of the
tournament. However, bookmakers are probably observing other information besides
rankings before setting their odds. We examine whether our findings hold when we
define as the high-skilled player the one who is favoured by the bookmakers (as shown by
the odds). The results from this test are shown in Column (5), whereby the coefficient
on GS is negative and significant (-2.6% in Panel A and -2.5% in Panel B).
For our baseline results we control for RSkill and test our hypothesis by observing
the coefficient on the intercept dummy GS. An alternative method is to use a slope
dummy, interacting RSkill with GS,31 expecting that the coefficient on the interaction is
negative and significant. The results shown in Column (6) show that this coefficient is
indeed negative and significant, and that the total effect of RSkill on bias is negative for
GS matches (0.000 - 0.013 = -0.013 in Panel A and 0.05 - 0.009 = -0.004 in Panel B).
30The results from the logit model show that the marginal effect associated with RStreak is positive
and significant. In addition, RStreak is higher for GS by roughly 2%. The results in Column (4) show
that agents are not properly pricing the effects of RStreak on the probability that the higher-ranked
player wins, as its coefficient is negative and significant. Note that this model entails a smaller number
of observations due to missing values in RStreak, which occur when a player did not compete in the two
previous tournaments.
31In this specification pˆi = Pr(Yi = 1|RSkilli, RSkilli×GSi) = F (α+ β1RSkilli + β2RSkilli×GSi).
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In untabulated analysis we find that our findings continue to hold when we estimate
the hypothesis using a quantile regression model, which controls for the confounding effect
of any outliers.32
Moreover, our results hold when we do not impose filter (ii) from Section 2.1,
which eliminates matches where the higher-ranked player is indicated as an outsider by
bookmakers even though he is ranked by at least 15 places higher than the lower-ranked
player. In this sample, the coefficient of GS is -2.46% for bookmaker data, and -2.02%
for betting exchange data, significant at the 1% level. The point estimates are slightly
lower in this setting, since rankings become noisier indicators of skill.33
Overall, the results in this section show that our conclusions are robust to different
bias and sample specifications.
[Insert Table 9 here]
3.7 Alternative Explanations
In this section, we discuss alternative explanations for our findings.
Our analysis shows that bookmakers are offering overly attractive odds to the
higher-ranked player winning a GS match, thus earn proportionately less. However,
their average profitability for GS matches remains positive. Could competition between
rational bookmakers to attract bets push them toward this equilibrium where they offer
overly attractive odds to the higher-ranked player for GS? The betting exchange data
show that volumes are larger for GS, which suggests that betting capital is not scarcer
for GS. So, it is not immediately clear why bookmakers face higher competition for GS.
32Specifically, instead of using the least squares regression in Equation (2), we estimate a model where
we express the median of the conditional distribution of bias as a linear function of GS and RSkill. The
coefficient of GS is -2.30% for bookmaker data and -1.50% for betting exchange data, significant at the
1% level.
33We conduct an additional test using a sample where, in addition to filter (ii) from Section 2.1, we
also drop matches that involve players ranked outside the top 100 in the world. Since player skill is a
pyramid, rankings are less informative for lower ranked players. Thus, in this sample, rankings are better
indicators of skill, so our results should be stronger (comparing with Tables 4 and 5). Indeed, in these
samples, the coefficient on GS is larger, equal to -4.0% in the bookmaker data and -3.02% in the betting
exchange data.
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Moreover, even if competition is higher for men’s GS matches, these competitive forces
should be absent for women’s matches, since since ∆bias = 0 in this sample. Finally,
competition in this sense does not apply to the betting exchange data, where the odds
on the two players are set through the trades of many different punters, who only enter
the market if the prevailing odds imply an “arbitrage opportunity” in relation to their
own subjective belief.34
GS matches are more prestigious events, thus more highly publicized than MS
matches. Could biases in GS matches be larger (∆bias < 0) because these matches
attract relatively more unsophisticated bettors who hold more biased expectations? This
“noise-trader” explanation could explain the findings with the betting exchange data for
men, but it cannot explain the findings with the bookmaker data where the same agents
are setting odds for both MS and GS matches. In addition, the biases found in the
women’s betting exchange data, where GS matches are also more prestigious and more
publicized, are opposite to those found in the men data (∆bias > 0). Therefore, under
this explanation, the increased noise trading in GS should produce opposite results in
men’s and women’s betting exchange markets.
Another alternative explanation is that there is a systematic error in pi that is
related to agent’s preferences, which is asymmetric across MS and GS. For example, if
bookmaker’s risk attitude changes for GS matches due to higher exposure coming from
heavier betting volumes, they will distort the odds offered for these matches further
from risk-neutral probabilities. This explanation could explain our findings for the men’s
bookmaker data, however it cannot explain the findings with the betting exchange data,
where the exposure of individual punters is the same across MS and GS. Moreover, for
bookmaker data, this explanation requires that these shifts in preferences do not occur
for women’s GS matches, since ∆bias = 0 in this sample.
Overall, these alternative explanations do not seem to be able to offer a parsimonious
34For example, suppose that the latest odds that player X wins are 1.50, indicating a probability of
roughly 67%. A punter who believes that this probability is in fact 60% will choose to improve on those
odds in order to take bets, and will offering odds of, say, 1.6 (implying a probability of 63%). If then
another punter improves further on these odds and offers 1.7 (implying a probability of 59%) the original
punter will choose to stay out of the market.
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explanation for all our results.
3.8 A Laboratory Experiment
Because our framework does not constitute a natural field experiment, we cannot con-
clusively rule out the possibility that our results are driven by an economic quantity that
varies between MS and GS. Motivated by this limitation our final robustness test is a
laboratory experiment, in which students were invited to predict the outcomes of tennis
matches.
To make sure that our subjects knew about tennis, and therefore could appreci-
ate the effect of match length on the probability that the higher-ranked player wins,
we only invited students that were involved in the Tennis Society of the University of
Surrey to participate. Our experiment attracted 17 students, who participated in two
different sessions lasting roughly an hour each. Each student received on average £22 for
participating in each session.
In each session subjects were asked to provide a probability that each player wins
for several upcoming matches. In the first session the 33 matches were from the Rome
ATP Masters (MS, BO3) and in the second the 64 matches were from the French Open
(GS, BO5). Both tournaments are played on the same surface (clay). For each match
we provided to subjects the name and ranking of each player at the start of the tourna-
ment. Moreover, our instructions in the beginning of each session explicitly mentioned
the format that these matches were played (BO3 or BO5). For both sessions students
received a show-up fee (£10) and a performance-related payment which depended on the
accuracy of their predictions. We used the quadratic scoring rule to incentivise subjects
choices, and the random lottery procedure to determine their performance-related pay-
ment in each session. Our full instructions, additional details about our experimental
protocol and various descriptive statistics are provided in Section 3 of the Appendix.
In the first session, subjects where firstly asked to consider the extent to which the
expression “I follow tennis closely” applies to them (1=Strongly Disagree, 2=Disagree,
3=Neutral,4=Agree, 5=Strongly agree). The mean response to this question was 3.64, in-
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dicating that on average our subjects did indeed follow tennis. To confirm this statement,
we also gave students 8 tennis-related quiz questions (4 in each session), and found that
on average students answered 5.4 of those questions correctly. The correlation between
the response to the first question and the number of correctly answered quiz questions
was roughly 0.7. These findings suggest that our subjects were on average knowledgable
about tennis.
The results are shown in Table 9. We used the same procedure as with the field
data to calculate bias for MS and GS. In Panel A, in a univariate setting, we see that pi
and pˆ for the MS matches are equal to 66.6%, and bias is equal to 0. For GS, we observe
that pˆ increases to 73%, but pi only increases to 69.8%, resulting to a significant bias of
-3.2%. ∆bias is negative and significant, equal to -3.2% consistent with our field results
from bookmakers and the betting exchange. In Panel B we conduct a regression that
controls for RSkill. The coefficient on GS remains negative at -3.3% and statistically
significant.
Although the magnitude of ∆bias in the experiment is very similar to that found in
the field data, closer inspection reveals that the extent of the bias is potentially larger in
the laboratory. In unreported analysis, when we regressed pi on GS and RSkill, we found
that the coefficient on GS is insignificant. This means that subjects do not consider the
effect of match length, and only increase their pi’s for GS matches because RSkill is higher
for these matches (see Table 2).35 Perhaps this difference arises because field agents are
more sophisticated than students.
Overall, the results from the experiment document the existence of biases due to
process variance neglect. This finding provides further support to the notion that our
baseline findings from the field reflect such biases.
35At the end of the second session, after all the data were collected, we asked students to list the major
factors that influenced their responses. Players rankings was the most important factor by nearly all the
students, whereas no student mentioned match format (MS vs. GS). This finding corroborates the result
that subjective probabilities are strongly linked RSkill but not the GS dummy.
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3.9 Process Variance Neglect in Financial Markets
In this section, we conduct a test of the underreaction due to process variance neglect hy-
pothesis in financial markets, examining how investors price earnings related information
that varies in process variance.
The signal we use is the median earnings forecast revision issued by professional sell-
side analysts for a specific company prior to the actual earnings announcement. To meas-
ure the process variance of the signal we split the companies in two groups: high-coverage
firms followed by many analysts, and low-coverage firms followed by few analysts. The
signal is of lower process variance for high-coverage firms because it incorporates inform-
ation from more analysts about future earnings. The hypothesis under process variance
neglect is that future stock returns are more predictable after low process variance sig-
nals, in the direction predicted by the signal (i.e., rise after positive revisions and fall
after negative revisions). To conduct the test we follow a standard approach used in the
empirical finance literature, which is explained in detail in Section 4 of the Appendix.
The results are shown in Table 11. We split our sample according to whether the
median revision is positive (Panel A) or negative (Panel B), and estimate three separate
models. In model (1) the dependent variable is a measure of the shock to earnings for firm
i in quarter t. Rev is the median forecast revision, and High Cov is a dummy that flags
firms that are followed my many analysts. The interaction Rev x High Cov is the variable
of interest, which tests whether earnings shocks are more predictable from lower process
variance signals. The results in Panel A for positive signals (Model 1) are supportive of
this notion, since Rev x High Cov is positive and significant, which implies that Bayesian
investors should respond stronger to these signals.36
36From Model 1 in Panel B we observe that negative signals are not more informative for higher
coverage firms. Although we do not have a conclusive answer as to why this occurs, the results from
previous studies are instructive. Specifically, a well-known finding in the analyst literature is that analysts
tend to be overly optimistic (e.g., Jackson, 2005), perhaps due to their career concerns (i.e., Hong and
Kubik, 2003). However, analysts also have the incentive to be accurate, which suggests that downward
forecasts that are issued closer to the earnings announcement, such as the ones we include in our sample,
are more likely to reflect a correction to previously optimistic forecasts as opposed to new information
(this notion is supported by the fact we have roughly 55% more downward revisions than upward revisions
in our sample). Given this evidence, a plausible explanation for the result from Model 1 in Panel B is
that the information in negative signals from high coverage firms is diluted due to optimistic analysts.
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This notion is tested by Model (2) in Panel A, where the dependent variable is the
cumulative, market-adjusted return for company i measured during the same period as
the signal. The results indeed confirm that investors are responding more strongly to
these signals, since Rev x High Cov is positive and significant.
To test the underreaction hypothesis we examine whether post-announcement re-
turns are more predictable from positive revisions for high-coverage firms. Under the null
of efficient markets future returns should be unpredictable (Samuelson, 1965). However,
as shown by Model 3 of Panel A future returns are strongly predictable in the direction
predicted by the hypothesis of process variance neglect.37
Although several patterns of underreaction in financial markets can be explained
by process variance neglect (e.g., the stock price response to earnings shocks and various
corporate events), the study by Dichev and Tang (2009) highlights this phenomenon
clearly. These authors first illustrate that the earnings of firms with lower earnings
variability are more predictable. They then examine whether sell-side analysts take into
account earnings variability when they issue their forecasts in response to earnings shocks.
In this setting, earnings variability captures the process variance of these signals. For
high-earnings volatility firms, strong earnings shocks in quarter t are less persistent and
therefore less predictive for earnings in quarter t+1. Thus, Bayesian analysts should revise
their forecasts toward the mean more strongly for these firms. The results of Dichev and
Tang (2009) show that analysts do consider earnings variability when forecasting, but
by only 50% of the amount required by full Bayesian reasoning. This is consistent with
process variance neglect, which is comparable in magnitude to our tennis-based results.
Overall, the results in this section are consistent with the notion that biases due to
process variance neglect operate in financial markets.
37A “rational” story for this finding is not straight forward, since it requires that higher coverage firms
with positive revisions are riskier, and thus command a higher risk premium.
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4 Conclusion
We conduct a field test of Bayesian reasoning by examining whether agents form expect-
ations by placing a larger weight on cues that are more informative with lower process
variance. We use subjective probabilities inferred from odds on the outcomes of ten-
nis matches, exploiting exogenous variation in process variance related to whether these
matches are played in a short or a long format. Under the null hypothesis of Bayesian
reasoning bookmakers should assign higher probabilities to the high-skilled players win-
ning the longer matches.
Our findings are consistent with underreaction due to “process variance neglect,”
i.e., bookmakers are not adjusting their subjective probabilities sufficiently to reflect
changes in process variance, and thus underestimate the probability that higher-skill
players win the longer matches. This result is robust to inferring subjective probabilities
from odds offered by professional bookmakers or odds achieved on a person-to-person
betting exchange. Moreover, the bias is costly as bookmakers are earning less for longer
matches. Overall, these findings support the notion that deviations from Bayes Rule
influence real-life decisions with considerable economic consequences.
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Figure 1: Probabilities in MS vs GS
This figure depicts average objective probabilities (blue bars) and average subjective probabil-
ities (red bars) for MS and GS matches.
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Table 1: Observations by Tournament and Year
This table shows a breakdown of the data used in the analysis sorted by tournament and year.
The data are retrieved from www.tennis-data.co.uk. Panel A contains data for Grand Slam
(GS) matches which are played in a best-out-of-five format, and Panel B for ATP World Tour
Masters 1000 (MS) matches, which are played in a best-out-of-three format. We drop non-
completed matches, matches with missing information or negative vig, and matches where the
higher-ranked player is indicated as an outsider by the odds even though he is ranked by at
least 15 places higher than then lower-ranked player. Our final sample contains 9,230 matches
from 2005-2014.
Year
Tournament 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 Total
Panel A: GS
Australian Open 111 112 111 114 112 112 108 108 117 99 1,104
French Open 107 102 101 111 109 115 114 114 112 116 1,101
US Open 109 108 107 117 109 109 104 114 108 109 1,094
Wimbledon 105 107 98 101 103 107 107 108 105 108 1,049
Other 6 6 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14
Total 438 435 419 443 433 443 433 444 442 432 4,362
Panel B: MS
Cincinatti 57 59 47 43 46 45 47 51 46 51 492
Hamburg 53 53 48 47 0 0 0 0 0 0 201
Indian Wells 81 78 84 78 80 79 72 80 74 85 791
Madrid 40 36 43 41 43 45 49 50 53 50 450
Miami 75 69 77 79 81 79 77 82 73 76 768
Monte Carlo 50 59 46 45 50 48 48 50 47 48 491
Montreal 55 0 49 0 50 0 50 0 49 0 253
Paris 37 38 43 38 41 43 41 42 43 40 406
Rome 54 46 46 42 51 49 45 49 51 48 481
Shanghai 0 0 0 0 44 47 48 52 49 50 290
Toronto 0 51 0 52 0 47 0 44 0 51 245
Total 502 489 483 465 486 482 477 500 485 499 4,868
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
This table shows descriptive statistics for the main variables used in our analysis. HROdds
and LROdds are the average decimal odds offered by the betting houses that the higher-ranked
(lower-ranked) player wins a match. Vig is the housetake, which is obtained by summing the
inverse of the odds for the higher- and lower-ranked players and subtracting one. HRRank and
LRRank are the rankings for the high and low ranked player, respectively. pˆ is the estimated
"objective" probability, obtained from averaging the predicted values from the logit model shown
in Equation (1) for MS and GS. piHR is the subjective probability that the higher-ranked player
wins the match, as derived from the bookmaker odds. The sample consists of 9,230 matches
that satisfy the criteria outlined in Table 1. The last row in the table shows the average prize
money collected by the winner of an MS and a GS tournament using 2015 prize money.
Variable Mean σ Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
Panel A: GS
HROdds 1.35 0.42 1.00 1.10 1.24 1.48 6.79
LROdds 6.05 5.73 1.09 2.62 4.01 7.17 60.00
V ig 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.11
HRRank 28 29 1 7 19 38 279
LRRank 99 96 2 48 80 119 1,370
pˆ 0.78 0.10 0.60 0.70 0.78 0.86 0.99
piHR 0.74 0.15 0.14 0.64 0.76 0.87 0.98
Prize Money ($) 2,525,000
Panel B: MS
HROdds 1.48 0.46 1.01 1.19 1.38 1.61 7.45
LROdds 4.10 3.25 1.09 2.27 3.01 4.58 32.80
V ig 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.09
HRRank 22 22 1 6 15 30 414
LRRank 67 83 2 29 49 78 1,517
pˆ 0.69 0.12 0.50 0.58 0.67 0.78 0.98
piHR 0.68 0.15 0.13 0.59 0.69 0.79 0.97
Prize Money ($) 790,000
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Table 3: Likelihood that higher-ranked player wins a Match
This table presents results from logit models, where the dependent variable takes the value of 1
if the higher-ranked player has won the match, and 0 otherwise. GS is a dummy variable that
equals 1 if the match is GS, and 0 otherwise. RSkill is calculated as the log (lower-ranked player
ranking) - log (higher-ranked player ranking) for MS (GS) matches. The table reports marginal
effects associated with each of the independent variables. The sample consists of 9,230 matches
that satisfy the criteria outlined in Table 1. The robust standard errors shown in brackets are
calculated using the Huber-White estimator. *,**,*** indicate statistical significance at the
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Variable (1) (2) (3)
GS 0.095*** 0.072*** 0.069***
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009]
RSkill 0.122*** 0.124***
[0.005] [0.005]
Surface F.E. NO NO YES
Year F.E. NO NO YES
Round F.E. NO NO YES
N 9,230 9,230 9,230
pseudo-R2 0.010 0.071 0.073
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Table 4: Biases in Subjective Probabilities
This table reports biases in subjective probabilities for GS and MS tennis matches. In Panel
A, we present univariate analysis, and in Panel B multivariate analysis. In Panel A, pi and
pˆ denote the average subjective and the average (estimated) objective probabilities that the
higher-ranked player wins an MS or a GS match. pˆ is obtained by averaging the predicted
values from the logit model shown in Equation (1) for MS and GS, and pi is derived from the
average odds on the higher-ranked player to win the match offered by the bookmakers. bias is
the average difference between pi and pˆ for MS and GS. In Panel B, we present results from OLS
regressions with an intercept. The dependent variable is Bias and the independent variables
are GS and RSkill, defined as in Table 3. The sample consists of 9,230 matches from 2005
to 2014 that satisfy the criteria outlined in Table 1. In Panel B the robust standard errors
shown in brackets are calculated using the Huber-White estimator. *,**,*** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Univariate
MS GS GS - MS
pi 0.681 0.743
pˆ 0.685 0.781
bias 0.004 -0.038 -0.034***
[0.002]
N 4,868 4,368
Panel B: Multivariate
Variable (1) (2)
GS -0.032*** -0.034***
[0.002] [0.002]
RSkill -0.007*** -0.005***
[0.001] [0.001]
Surface F.E. NO YES
Year F.E. NO YES
Round F.E. NO YES
N 9,230 9,230
R2 0.028 0.051
42
Table 5: Biases in Subjective Probabilities - Betting Exchange Data
This table reports biases in subjective probabilities for GS and MS tennis matches. The analysis
in Panel A and in Panel B Columns (1) and (2) is the same as in Table 4. For the analysis
in Column (3) we rank all matches according to type of match (MS vs. GS) and match round
(1 to 7), and note the median of each distribution. HighV ol equals 1 if a match is above this
median, and 0 otherwise. We drop non-completed matches, matches with missing information
or vig greater than 0.05, and matches which do not satisfy criterion (ii) in Section 2.1 of the
paper. The sample consists of 2,751 MS matches and 2,142 GS matches from 2009-2014. In
Panel B the robust standard errors shown in brackets are calculated using the Huber-White
estimator. *,**,*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Univariate
MS GS GS - MS
pi 0.701 0.764
pˆ 0.696 0.782
bias 0.005 -0.018 -0.023***
[0.003]
N 2,751 2,142
Panel B: Multivariate
Variable (1) (2) (3)
GS -0.023*** -0.027*** -0.030***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.005]
RSkill -0.001 0.002 -0.015***
[0.001] [0.002] [0.002]
HighV ol 0.067***
[0.004]
HighV ol ×GS 0.016**
[0.006]
Surface F.E. NO YES YES
Year F.E. NO YES YES
Round F.E. NO YES YES
N 4,893 4,893 4,893
R2 0.010 0.024 0.107
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Table 6: Bookmaker Profits
This table reports average values for different metrics of bookmaker’s profitability. In Panel A,
we use bookmaker odds and in Panel B betting exchange odds. The top row shows the variable
analyzed. rHR and rLR are the per unit profit earned by the bookmaker for the high and low
ranked player respectively, and is calculated using Equation (2). Π is an estimate of the actual
profit earned by the bookmakers, using volume information from the betting exchange, and is
calculated using Equation (3). HΠ is the average hypothetical profit earned by bookmakers
for GS matches, in a world where they raised for each GS match their subjective probability
on the higher-ranked player by an ammount equal to the average bias (from Tables 4 and 5).
The procedure used for this test is explained in Section 1 of the Appendix. The final column
presents the difference between HΠ and Π for GS matches. The third row in each panel shows
the difference between MS and GS. The standard errors are shown in brackets. *,**,*** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A:Bookmaker
Variable (1:rHR) (2:rLR) (3:Π) (4:HΠ) (5:HΠ− Π)
MS 0.050*** 0.094*** 0.050***
[0.010] [0.023] [0.007]
GS 0.005 0.298*** 0.025*** 0.055*** 0.030***
[0.009] [0.025] [0.007] [0.007]
∆(GS −MS) -0.045*** 0.204*** -0.025**
[0.013] [0.034] [0.010] [0.010]
Panel B:Betting Exchange
MS -0.010 -0.015 0.015**
[0.014] [0.039] [0.007]
GS -0.016 0.114* -0.005 0.015** 0.020***
[0.013] [0.069] [0.007] [0.006]
∆(GS −MS) -0.026 0.129* -0.019*
[0.020] [0.076] [0.010]
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Table 7: Likelihood that higher-ranked player wins a Match - Women’s Data
This table presents results from logit models, where the dependent variable takes the value of
1 if the higher-ranked player has won the match, and 0 otherwise. All variables are defined
as in Tables 3 and 4. In Columns 1 and 2 we estimate subjective probabilities using book-
maker data, and in Columns 3 and 4 using betting exchange odds. The robust standard errors
shown in brackets are calculated using the Huber-White estimator. *,**,*** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
A:Bookmaker B: Betting Exchange
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GS 0.042*** 0.017 0.028* 0.004
[0.012] [0.011] [0.015] [0.015]
RSkill 0.128*** 0.123***
[0.006] [0.008]
Surface F.E. NO YES NO YES
Year F.E. NO YES NO YES
Round F.E. NO YES NO YES
N 6,151 6,151 3,684 3,684
R2 0.002 0.065 0.001 0.060
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Table 8: Biases in Subjective Probabilities - Women’s data
This table reports biases in subjective probabilities for GS and MS women’s tennis matches,
presenting results from OLS regressions that include an intercept. The dependent variable is
bias and the independent variables are GS and RSkill, defined as in Table 4. In Columns (1) and
(2) we present results when subjective probabiities are derived from bookmaker odds, and in
Columns (3) and (4) Panel B when subjective probabilities are derived from betting exchange
odds. The robust standard errors shown in brackets are calculated using the Huber-White
estimator. *,**,*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
A:Bookmaker B: Betting Exchange
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
GS 0.001 -0.002 0.016*** 0.012***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004]
RSkill -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.000 0.002
[0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002]
Surface F.E. NO YES NO YES
Year F.E. NO YES NO YES
Round F.E. NO YES NO YES
N 6,151 6,151 3,684 3,684
R2 0.007 0.062 0.005 0.047
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Table 9: Robustness Checks
In this table we conduct various robustness checks. In (1) and (2) we estimate the hypothesis
without using parametric methods to estimate the objective probability, in (3) we estimate
the logit model using only backward looking information, in (4) we add an additional control
variable, in (5) we define the high-skilled player based on odds, and in (6) we test our hypothesis
by interacting GS with RSkill. More details for these tests are provided in Section 3.6 of the
paper. All models include an intercept term and surface, year and round fixed effects. In
Panel A (B) we derive subjective probabilities using bookmaker odds and in Panel B using
betting exchange odds. The robust standard errors shown in brackets are calculated using the
Huber-White estimator. *,**,*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively.
Panel A: Bookmaker
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GS -0.035*** -0.030*** -0.043*** -0.027*** -0.026***
[0.002] [0.009] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002]
RSkill -0.002* -0.007* -0.001 -0.003** 0.000
[0.001] [0.004] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
RStreak -0.022***
[0.004]
ROdds 0.001***
[0.000]
RSkill ×GS -0.013***
[0.001]
N 9,230 9,230 8,290 6,362 9,230 9,230
R2 0.049 0.004 0.052 0.050 0.040 0.037
Panel B: Betting Exchange
GS -0.026*** -0.022* -0.032*** -0.026*** -0.025***
[0.003] [0.012] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003]
RSkill 0.003* 0.002 -0.000 0.005** 0.005***
[0.002] [0.005] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002]
RStreak -0.024***
[0.006]
ROdds 0.001***
[0.000]
RSkill ×GS -0.009***
[0.001]
N 4,893 4,893 4,164 3,524 4,893 4,893
R2 0.023 0.005 0.039 0.029 0.047 0.016
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Table 10: A Laboratory Experiment
This table reports biases in subjective probabilities for GS and MS women’s tennis matches,
presenting results from OLS regressions that include an intercept. The dependent variable is
bias and the independent variables are GS and RSkill, defined as in Table 3. Subjective probab-
ilities were obtained from a laboratory experiment, where 17 subjects expressed probabilities for
97 professional men’s tennis matches, 33 played in an MS format and 64 played in a GS format.
The experiments were conducted at the University of Surrey, and included students who are re-
gistered in the University’s Tennis society. We incentivised students choices using the quadratic
scoring rule, and used the random lottery procedure to determine the payment. Instructions,
details on our experimental procedures and descriptive statistics are shown in Section 3 of the
Appendix. In both Panels the standard errors shown in brackets are clustered on the subject
level. *,**,*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Univariate
MS GS GS - MS
pi 0.666 0.698
pˆ 0.666 0.730
bias 0.000 -0.032 -0.032**
[0.012]
N 459 1,071
Panel B: Multivariate
Variable (1) (2)
GS -0.032*** -0.033**
[0.012] [0.012]
RSkill 0.003
[0.007]
N 1,530 7,569
R2 0.012 0.013
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Table 11: Process Variance Neglect in Financial Markets
This table reports results from OLS regressions with an intercept. Earnings data are from
IBES, and data on stock prices, shares outstanding and stock returns are from CRSP. The
sample period is from March 1994 to June 2016. In Columns 1 and 4 the depedent variable
is the earnings shock for company i at quarter t (SUE).In Columns 2 and 5 (3 and 6) the
depedent variable is cumulative abnormal return for firm i in the period -30,-4 (-1,65) relative
to the announcement date (CAR).Revision(Rev) is the median analyst forecast revision for
for company i at quarter t issued in the period -30,-4 relative to the earnings announcement
date. High Cov is a dummy that equals 1 if company i is at the top 30% in terms of analyst
coverage at time t. Dispersion is the coefficient of variation of these forecasts. LogMV is
the natural logarithm of firm size (price x shares outstanding).EP(+) is the earnings to price
ration for firm i, and ED is a dummy that flags companies with negative earnings. Lag(SUE)
is the most recent availiable earnings shock for company i prior to quarter t. In Panel A (B)
we perform a regression using firm-quarter observations where Revision> 0(< 0).All earnings-
related variables are winzorized at the 0.5 and 99.5 percentile. Details on variable definitions
and methodology can be found in Section 3 in the Appendix. We cluster standard errors at the
firm level. *,**,*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100.
A:Revision>0 B:Revision<0
Variable 1:SUE 2:ret−30,−4 3:ret−1,65 4:SUE 5:ret−30,−4 6:ret−1,65
Rev 59.00** 232.30*** 46.97 -137.26*** -253.89*** 88.95
[29.56] [78.76] [118.56] [11.37] [44.26] [71.54]
Rev. × High Cov. 113.62*** 277.62*** 506.74*** 4.38 15.34 -128.96
[36.43] [119.26] [191.71] [15.93] [69.09] [139.17]
High Cov. -0.18*** -0.14 -0.68 -0.10* -1.57*** 0.07
[0.06] [0.36] [0.54] [0.05] [0.38] [0.63]
Dispersion -0.17** -0.61* -0.40 -0.15*** 0.24 -0.04
[0.07] [0.38] [0.48] [0.03] [0.23] [0.38]
LogMV 0.08*** -0.43** -0.06 0.11*** 1.12*** 0.07
[0.02] [0.11] [0.20] [0.02] [0.11] [0.18]
EP (+) -36.64*** -24.73* 82.21*** -47.50*** 79.62*** 84.82***
[3.84] [13.95] [25.80] [3.57] [15.70] [24.66]
ED 1.21*** 0.30 -1.99 0.57*** -2.08*** -1.99
[0.17] [0.54] [1.52] [0.14] [0.49] [1.32]
SUE 59.22** 36.44
[25.44] [24.08]
Lag(SUE) 42.87*** 40.16***
[3.54] [2.43]
N 5,184 6,379 5,675 7,612 10,941 8,769
R2 0.477 0.101 0.080 0.571 0.136 0.074
Year-Quarter F.E. YES YES YES YES YES YES
49
Appendix
1. Expected Profits in GS
A. Bias and Expected Profits
The overall profitability of bookmakers depends on how the objective probability of the higher-
ranked player wining compares to the relative volume that backs this player. To illustrate,
assume that the objective probability that the higher-ranked player wins a match is pHR, and
correspondingly for the low ranked player is pLR = 1 − pHR. The bookmaker starts from this
probability, adjusts to reflect a vigorish, v, and a bias b, arriving at p∗HR:
p∗HR = (pHR + b)× (1 + v) (1)
Correspondingly, the adjusted probability for the low ranked player is:
p∗LR = ((1− pHR)− b)× (1 + v) (2)
The odds offered for the high- and lower-ranked player are thus dHR = 1p∗HR and dLR =
1
p∗LR
, respectively. Furthermore, V olHR and V olLR are the volumes that back the high and
lower-ranked players respectively, and TotV ol = V olHR + V olLR is the total volume staked.
The profit for the bookmaker for each match is therefore:
Π($) = TotV ol − V olHR×dHR ×DHR − (V olLR)× dLR ×DLR (3)
Dividing through by ToVol leads to Equation 3 in the paper, where RV olHR = V olHRTotV ol and
RV olLR = V olLRTotV ol
Π(%) = 1−RV olHR×dHR ×DHR −RV olLR × dLR ×DLR (4)
To illustrate the conditions that a negative bias (b < 0) is optimal it is useful to express
the above equation in expectation form, replacing the ex-post indicators DHR and DLR with
the corresponding ex-ante probabilities:
E(Π) = 1− pHR ×RV olHR × dHR − pLR ×RV olLR × dLR (5)
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Expressing the odds as a function of pHR, b and v:
E(RΠ) = 1− pHR ×RV olHR(pHR + b)× (1 + v) −
(1− pHR)× (1−RV olHR)
((1− pHR)− b)× (1 + v) (6)
We conduct a simple calibration to show how E(Π) varies with b and RV olHR, setting
pHR = 0.79 and v = 0.05. The results are shown in Figure 1 in this section of the Appendix.
From the top panel of Figure 1, starting with the black solid line where RV olHR = pHR, we
observe that E(Π) is inverse U-shaped, with a unique maximum at b = 0. When RV olHR < pHR
E(Π) increases as b decreases, and this relationship is steeper as RV olHR becomes smaller.
Conversely, when RV olHR > pHR E(Π) decreases as b becomes smaller, and this relationship
is steeper as RV olHR becomes larger.
In the bottom Panel of Figure 1 we plot the corresponding standard deviation of these
profits, σ(Π). If RV olHR = pHR, and b = 0 the bookmaker faces no risk. When RV olHR < pHR
a negative bias lowers σ(Π), whereas the opposite is true when RV olHR > pHR.
Thus, whether a negative bias is suboptimal, crucially depends on how RV olHR compares
with pHR for GS. If, on average, RV olHR > pHR, then the bookmaker is better off by increasing
the bias, receiving higher expected profits with lower standard deviation.
[Insert Figures 2 and 3 here]
A. Hypothetical Odds
The volume information from the betting exchange suggests that the negative bias in GS is
suboptimal (since on average RV olHR >
∑
DHR
N ). In Section 3.4 of the paper we illustrate this
by calculating the hypothetical profit of bookmakers in a scenario where they increase their
probabilities for the higher-ranked player for each match by an amount equal to the average
bias.
To calculate the numbers in Column 4 of Table 6 in the paper, we increase (decrease)
piHR (piLR) in each GS match by an amount equal to the average bias (3.41% in Panel A and
2.71% in Panel B), derive the new hypothetical odds as per Equations 1 and 2 from Section A
above, HOHR,i and HOLR,i, and calculate the hypothetical profits, HΠ.
Before we use the hypothetical odds to determine profits we need to consider how changing
the odds in this manner would influence RVol in this counterfactual scenario. To estimate the
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hypothetical RV olHR we use the model below, estimated using the betting exchange data for
GS matches:
RV olHR,i = α+ β ×OHR,i + i
We find that α is equal to 1.36 and β is equal to -0.36, both highly statistically significant.
This shows that when the odds on the higher-ranked player increase (i.e., when he becomes less
of a favourite), RV olHR decreases. This result reflects the preference of punters to bet on the
favourite (e.g., Levitt, 2004). We obtain the hypothetical RV olHR for each GS match by calcu-
lating αˆ+ βˆ ×HOHR,i. We use hypothetical volumes and odds, and the actual game outcomes
(as indicated by DHR) to calculate profits in this counterfactual scenario using equation 4 from
section A.
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Figure 1: Expected Profits, and Bias
This figure in the top Panel depicts Expected Profits (Y-axis) for different levels of bias (X-axis),
following the procedure explained in Section 1 of the Appendix. The figure in the bottom Panel
depicts the corresponding standard deviations.
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2. Descriptive Statistics for Betting Exchange and Women Data
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics - Betting Exchange
This table shows descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the analysis with the
Betting Exchange data. The variables are defined as in Table 1. Totvol is the total volume
that backs the higher-ranked player ($000’s), and Rvol is the proportion of the total volume
bet in the match on both players that backs the higher-ranked player. piHR is the subjective
probability that the higher-ranked player wins the match, as derived from the betting exchange
odds. We drop non-completed matches, matches with missing information or vig greater than
0.05, and matches which do not satisfy criterion (ii) in Section 2.1 of the paper. The sample
consists of 2,751 MS matches and 2,142 GS matches from 2009-2014.
Variable Mean σ Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
Panel A: GS
HROdds 1.39 0.49 1.01 1.09 1.26 1.52 8.60
LROdds 10.06 14.25 1.12 2.84 4.70 10.50 100.00
V ig 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.05
HRRank 27 29 1 7 18 36 285
LRRank 96 90 2 45 78 118 1,120
TotV ol 240 450 4 44 86 210 6,200
RV ol 0.86 0.20 0.02 0.85 0.94 0.97 1.00
pˆ 0.78 0.11 0.58 0.70 0.79 0.87 0.99
piHR 0.76 0.17 0.12 0.65 0.79 0.91 0.99
Panel B: MS
HROdds 1.52 0.54 1.01 1.21 1.40 1.66 9.00
LROdds 5.69 7.37 1.12 2.46 3.40 5.60 90.00
V ig 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.05
HRRank 21 23 1 5 14 29 414
LRRank 64 74 2 27 47 77 1,171
TotV ol 170 220 2.3 39 84 200 2,200
RV ol 0.82 0.23 0.02 0.81 0.91 0.96 1.00
pˆ 0.70 0.13 0.50 0.59 0.69 0.80 0.99
piHR 0.70 0.16 0.11 0.60 0.71 0.82 0.99
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics - Women’s Bookmaker Data
This table shows descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the analysis of the women
bookmaker data. The variables and the sample construction criteria are defined as in Table 2
in the paper. The sample consists of 2,527 MS matches and 3,624 GS matches from 2007 to
2014.
Variable Mean σ Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
Panel 1: GS
HROdds 1.38 0.46 1.01 1.12 1.27 1.51 9.40
LROdds 5.17 4.05 1.06 2.55 3.71 6.34 35.40
V ig 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.08
RankH 28 27 1 8 19 38 252
RankL 94 84 2 49 80 113 1,208
pˆ 0.75 0.11 0.55 0.65 0.74 0.83 0.98
piHR 0.73 0.15 0.10 0.63 0.74 0.85 0.97
Prize Money ($) 2,525,000
Panel B: MS
HROdds 1.46 0.42 1.01 1.19 1.36 1.59 5.47
LROdds 3.91 2.52 1.14 2.31 3.13 4.51 22.00
V ig 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.09
RankH 24 25 1 7 16 35 248
RankL 73 83 2 32 54 86 1,132
pˆ 0.70 0.11 0.53 0.60 0.69 0.79 0.98
piHR 0.69 0.14 0.17 0.59 0.70 0.79 0.98
Prize Money ($) 665,000
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics - Women’s Betting Exchange Data
This table shows descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the analysis of the women
bookmaker data. The variables and the sample construction criteria are defined as in Table 5
in the paper. The sample consists of 1,425 MS matches and 2,259 GS matches from 2009 to
2014.
Variable Mean σ Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
Panel A: GS
HROdds 1.44 0.54 1.01 1.15 1.33 1.57 11.50
LROdds 6.88 8.62 1.09 2.68 3.90 7.20 100
V ig 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.05
RankH 27 27 1 8 19 37 252
RankL 92 82 2 48 79 113 1,208
TotV ol 120 250 0.36 19.09 42.96 110 2,900
RV ol 0.85 0.21 0.01 0.84 0.93 0.97 1.00
pˆ 0.74 0.11 0.55 0.65 0.73 0.82 0.97
piHR 0.73 0.16 0.09 0.63 0.75 0.86 0.99
Panel B: MS
HROdds 1.52 0.57 1.02 1.24 1.41 1.67 6.20
LROdds 4.56 4.18 1.17 2.44 3.30 4.80 46.00
V ig 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05
RankH 24 24 1 7 16 35 217
RankL 71 77 2 32 53 82 1,004
TotV ol 55.52 82.48 0.41 12.76 25.51 58.56 690
RV ol 0.82 0.23 0.02 0.79 0.91 0.96 1.00
pˆ 0.71 0.11 0.54 0.61 0.70 0.79 0.97
piHR 0.69 0.15 0.16 0.59 0.70 0.80 0.98
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3. Laboratory Experiment
Instructions and Procedures
In this section we include the full-instructions seen by the students, shown below. The state-
ments in brackets in italics are clarifying additions, not seen by the students.
Welcome to the experiment!
This experiment is about predicting the outcome of professional tennis matches. The
matches that you will be predicting in this session are matches that will be played at the ATP
1000 Masters event that is happening right now in Rome. The winner is decided in a best-of-
three-set match. Before moving to the predictions please answer the questions below. For each
of the quiz questions in Section 3 that you answer correctly you will receive an additional 50
pence (£0.50) at the end of the session.
[For the second session, the second and third sentence where replaced with: The matches
that you will be predicting in this session are matches that will be played at the French Open
that is happening right now in Paris. The winner is decided in a best-of-five-set match.]
[Students then provided the following information: Name, student ID, and Degree title.]
[Students then were asked to circle the answer that most applied to them in relation to the
statement “I follow tennis closely”, from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree” (5 levels)]
[Students then answered 4 tennis related trivia questions, like “How many Grand Slam
titles has Roger Federer won?]
[Students then proceeded to the next part of the instructions]
About probabilities
For each match we will tell you the players involved and their corresponding rankings.
Your task is to think how likely each player is to win the match, and express this likelihood as
a probability between 0% and 100%. Of course, we do not know yet the outcome of the match,
so there is uncertainty.
To provide you with some background about probabilities, suppose we have a normal six-
sided die, and you want to calculate the probability of rolling the die and getting a three (3).
To calculate this probability you need to count how many outcomes lead to a “win”, and divide
that by how many outcomes are possible. In this case, a win occurs with only one outcome,
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which is to roll the die and get a three (3). There are six (6) possible outcomes (numbers 1
to 6) and, therefore, the probability of rolling a three (3) in one roll is 1/6 (or roughly 17%).
If instead you want to calculate the probability of rolling the die and getting an even number
(2, 4, 6), then this probability is higher because you win with three outcomes instead of one,
therefore the probability of winning in one roll is 3/6 (or 50%).
A similar logic can be applied when thinking about probabilities of players winning a
tennis match. For example, suppose that we have a match between players A and B. To
calculate the probability of each player winning this match you need to estimate how many
matches each player would win, if they hypothetically played 100 matches in total. For example,
suppose that you think that B is a better player than A, so B would win 70 matches out of 100
(and correspondingly A would win 30 matches out of 100). This means that your estimated
probability of B winning the match is 70/100 (or 70%) and of A 30/100 (or 30%).
Your task is to think along these lines for each match and provide your best
estimate of the probability of each player winning the match. Note that the prob-
abilities you express for the two players in each match must equal to 100% when
added together! (in the above example 70%+30%=100%)
Please note that in our analysis we will use your predictions in the experiment anonym-
ously.
[Students first read the above silently, and then it is read aloud by the experiment asking
for clarifying questions.]
[Students then proceeded to the next part of the instructions]
How you will get paid for your predictions.
Apart from the money that you will be paid for showing up and for answering correctly
the quiz questions, you will also be paid a performance-based payment. This payment
will be based on the accuracy of your predictions using a procedure that is commonly used in
economics experiments, known as the quadratic scoring rule.
[Students received £0.5 for each quiz question answered correctly]
To illustrate how this works, let’s return to our hypothetical example between players A
and B where your best guess of the probability that B wins is 70% (or 0.7). In this case, your
payment would be calculated using the formula below:
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Payment = £13 - £13 x (D − p)2
The symbol p in the equation stands for your estimate of the probability that player B
wins, in this case 0.7. D is an indicator, which takes the value of 1 if B has won the match, or
0 if A has won the match. Of course you do not know D when you make your choices, this will
be revealed after the match is played and we know the winner.
Assume, for example, that the match is now finished and player B has won. This means
your prediction in this case was good in the sense that you assigned a higher probability to B
winning. Your payment in this case would be:
Payment = £13 - £13 x (1− 0.7)2=£13 - £13 x (0.3)2=£13-£1.17=£11.83
[This equation is written on the board and explained by the experimenter, when he read
the instructions aloud]
If you had assigned a higher probability to B winning, say 0.8, your payment would be even
higher and equal to:
£13 - £13 x (1− 0.8)2=£12.48.
However, you need to be careful, because the higher the probability you give for B winning,
the lower your payment will be if A wins.
For example, when your probability of B winning is 0.7, your payment if A wins is:
£13 - £13 x (0− 0.7)2=£13-£13 x (−0.7)2 = $13- £6.37=£6.63.
When your probability of B winning is 0.8, your payment if A wins is even lower:
£13 - £13 x (0− 0.78)=£13-£13 x (−0.8)2 = $13- £8.32=£4.68.
In general, with this payoff scheme, the largest possible payment is £13, which you will
receive if you assign a 100% chance to B wining, and B wins. However, if you choose to assign
100% probability to B but A wins, your payment will be the lowest possible, equal to £0.
Since your prediction is made before the match is played and therefore you do not know
what will actually happen, the best thing you can do to maximize the expected payoff
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is to simply state what is your best guess for the probability that B wins the match.
Any other prediction will decrease the amount you can expect to earn.
You will assign probabilities to players for several matches, and at the end we will ran-
domly choose one of these matches to calculate your performance payment. This random
choice will be made in your presence, at the end of this session. Of course we won’t know the
outcome of the match at the end of the session, so we will calculate your payment in a few
days after the winner is announced. You will collect your performance-payment for this session
after the second session of this experiment is completed. The details on how to collect your
performance-based payment will be given to you at the end of the second session.
The second session will be held on Sunday 28th May at 10:00 a.m.
[Students first read the above silently, and then it is read aloud by the experiment asking
for clarifying questions.]
[Students then proceeded to provide their choices for the different matches]
[When all the students finished, each student approached the experimenter individually to
receive the show-up fee and to select the match that would determine their performance-related
payoff. The performance-related payoff for the first session was paid at the end of the second
session, and the performance related payment for the second session was paid a few days after
the end of that session when the games were completed.]
[In our sessions we also asked students to make predictions for the women’s matches in
the corresponding tournaments, and found results that are in line with those in the paper for
the betting exchange (i.e., 4bias > 0). To conserve space we do not report these results here,
but they are available from the authors on request. The performance-based payment for each
student in each session was calculated on the basis of one randomly selected match].
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics - Laboratory Experiment
This table shows descriptive statistics for the sample generated in the laboratory experiment.
17 students participated, who made choices for 33 MS matches and 64 GS matches. The GS
matches were all first-round matches. The MS matches contained 7 qualifying matches, 17 first
round matches and 9 second round matches. For each of the second round matches, we asked
students to make assesments for each of the 4 possible combinations that could have resulted
from the first round matches, which were unkown at the time that the MS session was held. The
qualifying matches and the second round matches were included to increase the MS sample.
Variable Mean σ Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
Panel A: GS
RankH 41 31 1 17 19 33 129
RankL 125 82 37 70 98 153 463
pˆ 0.73 0.10 0.59 0.63 0.75 0.79 0.95
piHR 0.70 0.17 0.20 0.60 0.70 0.80 1.00
Panel B: MS
RankH 31 21 1 14 29 50 76
RankL 83 86 21 32 52 87 403
pˆ 0.67 0.10 0.56 0.58 0.63 0.72 0.93
piHR 0.67 0.17 0.10 0.55 0.65 0.80 1.00
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4. Process Variance Neglect in Financial Markets
This analysis uses earnings data from the IBES detail files that are adjusted for stock
splits. We start the analysis in 1994 because prior to this year forecast release dates are
inaccurate (Hilary and Hsu, 2013). From the initial file we drop observations with missing
analyst codes and retain only one-quarter ahead earnings per share forecasts. If an analyst
has made more than one forecast on the same day for the same company and quarter, we
retain the forecast with the smallest absolute forecast error, defined as |Forecast−Actual
Actual
|.
To obtain the revision in analyst j’s forecast we calculate the difference between the last
forecast made by analyst j for company i at quarter t with the penultimate forecast made
by the same analyst for the same firm and quarter. In our sample we include revisions
issued in the window between -30 and -4 relative to the earnings announcement date. It
is commonly known that forecasts issued closer to the quarter end are more informative
(Clement and Tse, 2005). Since we require a signal that is relevant when predicting
earnings to test for process variance neglect, we focus on forecasts issued closer to the
quarter end.
To this dataset we merge data on stock prices and shares outstanding from CRSP
at the end of the previous quarter t-1. To be included in our sample a firm must be
followed by at least 5 analysts in quarter t and and have a stock price greater than 5
dollars at the end of quarter t-1. These filters are commonly used in the the analyst
literature to reduce the effect of outliers due to particularly low analyst coverage and/or
and small and illiquid firms (Chen and Jiang, 2006; Hilary and Hsu, 2013; Malmendier
and Shanthikumar, 2014).
To calculate analyst coverage we follow a procedure similar to Hong and Stein
(2000), who note that analyst coverage is strongly and positively related to firm size.
Thus, if one sorts only on “raw” analyst coverage, there is a danger that any findings
are reflecting variations on firm size. To eliminate this possibility we regress the natural
logarithm of analyst coverage for firm i at quarter t on the natural logarithm of its market
value at the end of quarter t-1, and use the residual from this regression as our measure
of analyst coverage. Although this approach uses forward looking information, i.e., we
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run one regression using all our data from 1994-2016 , the results are unlikely to change
materially if we use backward looking information with rolling regressions because, as
noted by Hong and Stein (2000), the relationship between analyst coverage and firm size
is quite stable over time. In each quarter we then sort firms into deciles according to
residual analyst coverage, and if a firm belongs in the top 30% of this distribution the
dummy High Coverage is set to 1, otherwise it is 0.38
The cumulative abnormal returns for firm i are calculated from the day -1 to +65,
relative to the earnings announcement date. To obtain abnormal returns we subtract
from the returns of stock i at day t the corresponding returns of the market portfolio
on the same day, measured using the value-weighted average of the returns of all stocks
included in the CRSP database. We allow a gap of 2 days between the calculation of
Signal (ending in day -4) and the cumulation of returns (starting in day -1) to ensure
that the signal is known to investors. Table 1 in this section defines all the variables used
in the regressions in Table 11 of the main paper.
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Table 5: Variable Definitions
This table provides definitions for all the variables used in the regressions in Table 11 in the
paper.
Variable Description
SUE Earnings of firm i during quarter t minus the earnings of the
same firm for the same quarter in the previous year, scaled
by stock price measured at the end of quarter t-1.
CAR The cumulative, market-adjusted return for firm i in the
period [-30,-4] and [-1 to +65] relative to the earnings an-
nouncement date.
Rev The median analyst forecast revision for firm i during
quarter t using all revsisions issued in the period -30 to -4
relative to the earnings announcement date, scaled by stock
price at the end of quarter t-1. For the models that includes
the observations where Signal is less than 0 (A1 and B4 in
Table 10) we use its absolute value in the regression.
High Cov A dummy variable that equals 1 if firm i during quarter t
is at the top 30% in analyst coverage that is orthogonal to
firm size.
Dispersion The coefficient of variation using all earnings forecasts for
company i and quarter t issued in the period -30 to -4 rel-
ative to the earnings announcement data. We first calculate
the standard deviation of these earnings forecasts, and scale
by the absolute value of the mean forecast.
LogMV The natural logarithm of firm value for company i at the
end of the previous quarter, measured as price x shares out-
standing.
EP(+) The earnings-to-price ratio for firm i, using earnings and
stock price in the previous quarter. If the earnings of the
company were negative EP(+) is set to 0.
ED A dummy variable that equals 1 if earnings for firm i in the
previous quarter were negative, and 0 otherwise.
Lag(SUE) The most recent availiable earnings shock for company i in
our sample prior to quarter t, weighted by W. To calculate
W we count the number of days between the end of quarter
t and the previous quarter for which a SUE observation is
availiale for company i in our sample (Days). W is equal to
90/Days, so that SUE’s that are further back in time receive
a lower weight.
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